Coalitional strategy-proof and resource-monotonic solutions for multiple assignment problems. by Ehlers, Lars & Klaus, Bettina
Abstract. We consider the problem of allocating indivisible objects when
agents may desire to consume more than one object and monetary transfers
are not possible. Each agent receives a set of objects and free disposal is
allowed. We are interested in allocation rules that satisfy ‘‘appealing’’ prop-
erties from an economic and social point of view. Our main result shows that
sequential dictatorships are the only eﬃcient and coalitional strategy-proof
solutions to the multiple assignment problem. Adding resource-monotonicity
narrows this class down to serial dictatorships.
1 Introduction
We investigate the problem of assigning indivisible objects to a set of agents
when monetary transfers are not possible. Most of the literature considers
situations where each agent receives exactly one object. Such problems arise
when we have to assign jobs to workers, or apartments to students. For the
assignment problem (with or without property rights) where each agent may
receive at most one object and monetary transfers are not allowed, rules
satisfying desirable properties were recently studied; see for instance Ehlers
(2002), Ehlers et al. (2002), Ehlers and Klaus (2003), Ergin (2000), Ma (1994),
Miyagawa (2002), Pa ´ pai (2000a), and Svensson (1994).
We depart from the above papers and consider so-called multiple
assignment problems. Each agent receives a set of objects and monetary
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consisting of indivisible objects (e.g., furniture and household items) that
has to be distributed among the heirs (e.g., the children of the deceased),
respecting the wish that the objects should not be sold but allocated. Since
agents may receive sets of objects, there are several interesting preference
domains one could consider. Pa ´ pai (2000b,2001) studies the multiple
assignment problem on the domain of strict preferences and on monotonic
preference domains (on the monotonic preference domain any set of objects
is strictly preferred to all of its proper subsets and on the quantity-mono-
tonic preference domain receiving more objects is always preferred to
receiving fewer objects).
We consider the same domains of preference relations as in Klaus and
Miyagawa (2001): the domain of strict preferences, the domain of additive
and strict preferences, and the domain of responsive, separable, and strict
preferences. Our main focus however is on responsive, separable, and strict
preferences. For example, separability implies that if object x is a ‘‘good’’
(receiving x is preferred to receiving nothing), then for each set of objects not
containing x, receiving this set and x is preferred to receiving only this set. So,
in line with our assumption of free disposal, separability excludes the possi-
bility that x becomes a ‘‘bad object’’ if an agent consumes it with another set
of objects – a natural assumption in the heritage example.
We search for solutions (or assignment rules) that satisfy ‘‘desirable’’
properties from an economic and social point of view. Most of the literature
concerned with this ‘‘axiomatic’’ approach to assignment problems is for
models which also include the possibility of monetary transfers; for the class
of multiple assignment problems see Bevia ´ (1998) and Tadenuma (1996).
Surprisingly, the results for the multiple assignment problems we study here
and assignment problems where each agent may receive at most one object
are very diﬀerent. Whereas in the latter case natural trading mechanisms (e.g.,
the core) satisfy many desirable properties, this is not the case for multiple
assignment problems. The results we obtain might be interpreted as negative
results since, depending on the preference domain, either incompatibility of
the properties result or the set of allocation rules is narrowed down to
sequential or serial dictatorship rules only. However, a practical advantage of
serial (sequential) dictatorships is that they are simple and can be imple-
mented easily. Furthermore, they are eﬃcient, strategy-proof, and satisfy
other appealing properties discussed below. They can be considered to be
‘‘fair’’ if the ordering of the agents is fairly determined; for instance by
queuing, seniority, or randomization (Abdulkadirog ˘ lu and So ¨ nmez
1998,1999; Bogomolnaia and Moulin 2001).
We brieﬂy discuss the organization of the paper and our results. In Sect. 2
we introduce the model and two basic properties. First of all, we impose
eﬃciency, meaning that a rule only chooses eﬃcient assignments. Second, in
order to eliminate proﬁtable misrepresentation of only privately known
preferences, we impose strategy-proofness (no agent ever gains by misrepre-
senting his preferences).
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strategy-proofness (no group of agents ever gains by jointly misrepresenting
their preferences). Our main result is that eﬃciency and coalitional strategy-
proofnessonlyallowforsequentialdictatorships;i.e.,thereexistsaﬁrstdictator
who always chooses his best set of objects. Depending on the ﬁrst dictator’s
choice, asecond dictatorisdetermined who againchooseshisbestsubsetofthe
remaining objects. Depending on the choices of the previous dictators, a third
dictatorisdeterminedetc.,Pa ´ pai(2001)showsthesameresultonthedomainof
strictpreferences.However,Pa ´ pai’sproofusespreferencerelationsthatarenot
separable and therefore having a larger preference domain makes coalitional
strategy-proofness a stronger property. Consequently, Pa ´ pai’s and our proof
are completelydiﬀerent. Furthermore, itissurprising thatherresult even holds
onmuchsmallerdomains,namelythedomainofadditiveandstrictpreferences
and the domain of responsive, separable, and strict preferences. For various
domains, we are able to give a characterization of eﬃcient and coalitional
strategy-proof rules for the multiple assignment problem. When each agent
receives exactly one object the characterization of the rules satisfying eﬃciency
and coalitional strategy-proofness is still missing.
In Sect. 4 we consider the multiple assignment problem for variable sets of
indivisible objects. Resource-monotonicity describes the eﬀect of a change in
the available resource on the welfare of the agents. A rule satisﬁes resource-
monotonicity, if after such a change either all agents (weakly) lose together or
all (weakly) gain together. On the domain of responsive, separable, and strict
(or additive and strict) preferences, the solidarity property resource-monoto-
nicity is compatible with both eﬃciency and coalitional strategy-proofness. All
three properties together characterize the class of serial dictatorships. On the
domain of strict preferences, eﬃciency, coalitional strategy-proofness, and
resource-monotonicity are not compatible.
2 The model and basic properties
We consider the same multiple assignment model as Pa ´ pai (2001) and Klaus
and Miyagawa (2001). Let K  f x1;...;xkg denote the ﬁnite set of objects and
N  f 1;...;ng the ﬁnite set of agents. We always assume that jKj¼k   2
and jNj¼n   2. Let 2K denote the set of all subsets of K including the empty
set. For subsets of K consisting of exactly one object, with some abuse of
notation, we omit the brackets and write x instead of fxg. Each agent i 2 N
has a complete and transitive preference relation Ri over 2K. The associated
strict preference relation is denoted by Pi. We assume that Ri is strict; that is,
for all distinct subsets S;S0   K, we have either SPiS0 or S0PiS. Thus, SRiS0
means that either SPiS0 or S ¼ S0. We further assume that Ri is responsive and
separable.
A preference relation is responsive if, for any two sets that diﬀer only in
one object, the set containing the more preferred object is preferred to the
other: for all S   K and all x;y 2 KnS;
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A preference relation is separable if x 2 K is preferred to nothing if and
only if for all sets S 2 2K not containing x, S [ x is preferred to S: for all S   K
and all x 2 KnS;
xPi;( )ðS [ xÞPiS:
Together with strictness and completeness of preferences this implies that for
all S   K and all x 2 KnS;
;Pix() SPiðS [ xÞ:
Roth (1985) introduced responsiveness of preference relations for college
admission problems (Gale and Shapley, 1962). For the notion of separability
we use here, we refer to Barbera ` et al. (1991).
Let R be the set of responsive, separable, and strict preference relations
over 2K:1 Let S denote the class of strict preference relations over 2K and A
the class of additive and strict preference relations over 2K.2 Note that
A(R(S. If not otherwise stated, we assume that preferences are respon-
sive, separable, and strict; that is, R is our default preference domain. In what
follows, all deﬁnitions using the preference domain R also apply to the
preference domains A and S.
A preference proﬁle is a list R ¼ð R1;R2;...;RnÞ such that for all i 2 N,
Ri 2 R. Let RN denote the set of preference proﬁles. Since, for the time being,
the set of agents and the set of objects are ﬁxed, RN completely describes the
set of multiple assignment problems.
Given m   k and an ordered collection of objects fy1;y2;...;ymg K, let
Lðy1;y2;...;ymÞ be the class of preference relations Ri 2 R such that
y1Piy2Pi    PiymPi; and for all y 2 K nf y1;...;ymg, ;Piy. Note that then
responsiveness and separability imply fy1;y3gPify2;y3gPi;Piymþ1 and so on.
Furthermore, let Lð;Þ be the set of preference relations Ri 2 R such that for
all y 2 K, ;Piy. The set Lð;Þ contains the preference relations where each
object is conceived to be a ‘‘bad’’.
Given Ri 2 R, let BðRiÞ f x 2 K j xPi;g be the set of objects that are each
preferred to ;. Objects belonging to BðRiÞ are conceived to be ‘‘goods’’.
Separability of Ri implies that BðRiÞ is the most preferred set at Ri for agent i;
i.e., for all S 2 2K, BðRiÞRiS.
1 All results that we establish for the domain of responsive, separable, and strict
preferences also remain true on the domain of separable and strict preferences.
2 A preference relation R1 is additive if there exists a function u:K [;!R such that
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all i;j 2 N such that i 6¼ j, Si \ Sj ¼; . The set Si is the (possibly empty) set of
objects assigned to agent i. The second condition simply says that no two
agents receive the same object. Note that we allow free disposal and therefore
the union of all Si’s may be a strict subset of K.
An assignment rule,o rrule for short, is a function u that associates with
each preference proﬁle R 2 RN an assignment uðRÞ¼ð uiðRÞÞi2N. We are
interested in rules satisfying the following properties.
A rule u is eﬃcient if it chooses for each proﬁle an eﬃcient assignment.
Eﬃciency. For all R 2 RN; there is no assignment ðSiÞi2N such that for all
i 2 N, SiRiuiðRÞ, with strict preference holding for some j 2 N:
It is straightforward to check that separability of preference relations and
free disposal imply the following (Klaus and Miyagawa 2001).
Lemma 1. If a rule u is eﬃcient, then for all R 2 RN;
(i) for all i 2 N, uiðRÞ BðRiÞ and
(ii) [i2NuiðRÞ¼[ i2NBðRiÞ:
It is easy to see that the converse of Lemma 1 is wrong.3
The following notation will be useful later on. Given R 2 RN and M   N;
let RM denote the preference proﬁle ðRiÞi2M. It is the restriction of R to the set
M: Given i;j 2 N , we also use the notation R i   RNnfig and R i;j   RNnfi;jg.
A rule u is strategy-proof if no agent ever beneﬁts from misrepresenting his
preferences. In game theoretical terms, a rule is strategy-proof if in its asso-
ciated direct revelation game, it is a weakly dominant strategy for each agent
to announce his true preference relation.





In this section we investigate a stronger nonmanipulation condition than
strategy-proofness. A rule u satisﬁes coalitional strategy-proofness if no coa-
lition of agents ever beneﬁts from misrepresenting their preferences.
Coalitional strategy-proofness. For all R 2 RN and all M   N, there exists no
R0 2 RN such that R0
NnM ¼ RNnM and for all i 2 M, uiðR0ÞRiuiðRÞ with strict
preference holding for some j 2 M:
3 For example, let n ¼ 2, k ¼ 2, R1 2 Lðx1;x2Þ, and R2 2 Lðx2;x1Þ. The assignment
ðx2;x1Þ satisﬁes (i) and (ii) of Lemma 1 but is Pareto dominated by ðx1;x2Þ.
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the agents can inﬂuence the allocation of some other agent by unilaterally
changing his preferences without changing his own allocation. This concept
of non-bossiness was introduced by Satterthwaite and Sonnenschein (1981).4
Non-bossiness. For all R 2 RN, all i 2 N; and all R0
i 2 R,
if uiðRÞ¼uiðR0
i;R iÞ, then uðRÞ¼uðR0
i;R iÞ:
The following lemma is straightforward.
Lemma 2. If a rule u satisﬁes coalitional strategy-proofness, then it satisﬁes
strategy-proofness and non-bossiness.
Our main result is a characterization of the class of eﬃcient and coalitional
strategy-proof rules. A rule satisfying these properties is a ‘‘sequential dicta-
torship’’: a ﬁrst dictator chooses his most preferred set of objects; depending
on the ﬁrst dictator’s choice, a second dictator is determined who again
chooses his most preferred subset of the remaining objects; depending on the
choices of the previous dictators, a third dictator is determined and so on. In
order to formalize the class of sequential dictatorships we need some addi-
tional notation.
A permutation p on N is a bijective function p:N ! N. Let PN denote the
set of all permutations on N. Given p 2 PN and i 2 N, we interpret agent pðiÞ
to be the ith ‘‘dictator’’.















We call agent pRð1Þ the ﬁrst dictator at R, agent pRð2Þ the second dictator at R,
etc.
For all R;   R R 2 RN and pR;p  R R 2 PN as speciﬁed above, the following two
conditions must be satisﬁed:
(i) pRð1Þ¼p  R Rð1Þ.
(ii) Let m 2f 1;...;n   1g. If for all i 2f 1;...;mg, pRðiÞ¼p  R RðiÞ and
upRðiÞðRÞ¼up   R RðiÞð  R RÞ, then pRðm þ 1Þ¼p  R Rðm þ 1Þ:  
4 Since preferences are strict, we could equivalently deﬁne non-bossiness in terms of
welfare.
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ﬁrst dictator. In (ii) we formalize that the choice of the next dictator who is
allowed to choose his most preferred set of objects from the remaining
objects only depends on the previous dictators and their individual choices and
not on the exact preferences of the previous dictators or the remaining agents.
A subclass of sequential dictatorships are serial dictatorships. Here, the
choice of the next dictator does not depend on the sets of objects chosen by
the ﬁrst dictators. Formally, a rule u is a serial dictatorship if u is a sequential
dictatorship and there exists   p p 2 PN such that for all R 2 RN,
upRðRÞ¼u  p pðRÞ.
Theorem 1. The following statements are equivalent.
(a) u is a sequential dictatorship.
(b) u satisﬁes eﬃciency and coalitional strategy-proofness.
(c) u satisﬁes eﬃciency, strategy-proofness, and non-bossiness.
Proof.
(a) implies (b). It is straightforward to check that sequential dictatorships
satisfy eﬃciency and coalitional strategy-proofness.
(b) implies (c). By Lemma 3, coalitional strategy-proofness implies strategy-
proofness and non-bossiness.
(c) implies (a). Let u be a rule satisfying eﬃciency, strategy-proofness, and
non-bossiness. We show in four steps that u is a sequential dictatorship.
Step 1. We show that there exists j 2 N such that for all R 2 RN, if for all
i 2 N, BðRiÞ¼K, then
ujðRÞ¼K: ð1Þ
Let R 2 RN be such that for all i 2 N, BðRiÞ¼K. Suppose that for all
i 2 N, uiðRÞ 6¼ K.B yeﬃciency and Lemma 1, [i2NuiðRÞ¼K. Without loss of
generality, we suppose that x1 2 u1ðRÞ 6¼;and x2 2 u2ðRÞ 6¼; .
Let ðR1;R2;R0
 1;2Þ2RN be such that for all i 2 Nnf1;2g;BðR0
iÞ¼uiðRÞ.
If we change R stepwise to ðR1;R2;R0
 1;2Þ, then strategy-proofness and
non-bossiness imply that uðR1;R2;R0
 1;2Þ¼uðRÞ. In particular,
x1 2 u1ðR1;R2;R0
 1;2Þ and x2 2 u2ðR1;R2;R0
 1;2Þ. Let R0
2 2 R be such that
BðR0
2Þ¼u2ðR1;R2;R0
 1;2Þ[x1 and for all y 2 u2ðR1;R2;R0
 1;2Þ, yP0
2x1.B y




 1;2Þ.B ynon-bossiness, uðR1;R0
 1Þ¼uðR1;R2;R0
 1;2Þ. Let R0
1 2 R
be such that BðR0
1Þ¼u1ðR1;R0
 1Þ[x2 and for all y 2 u1ðR1;R0
 1Þ;yP0
1x2.
Similarly as above it follows that uðR0Þ¼uðR1;R0
 1Þ.
If u1ðR0Þ¼f x1g, then let   R R1 ¼ R0
1. Suppose that ju1ðR0Þj   2. Let
  R R1 2 Lðx1;x2Þ be such that u1ðR0Þ  P P1;.B yeﬃciency, u1ð  R R1;R0
 1Þ f x1;x2g.B y
strategy-proofness and construction of   R R1, ju1ð  R R1;R0
 1Þj   1. Thus, by the
previous facts, eﬃciency, x1   P P1x2, and x2P0
2x1 , we have u1ð  R R1;R0
 1Þ¼f x1g or
u1ð  R R1;R0
 1Þ¼f x1;x2g.
Multiple assignment problems 271Suppose that u1ð  R R1;R0
 1Þ¼f x1;x2g. Let R00





u1ðR0Þnx1   u1ðR00
1;R0






 1Þ¼u1ðR0Þnx1 or u1ðR00
1;R0
 1Þ¼u1ðR0Þ. Then,




 1Þ; a contradiction to strategy-proofness.
Suppose that u1ðR00
1;R0




 1Þ; a contradiction to strategy-proofness.
Suppose that u1ðR00
1;R0





Thus, we have u1ð  R R1;R0
 1Þ¼f x1g.B yeﬃciency, for all i 2 Nnf1g,
uið  R R1;R0
 1Þ¼uiðR0Þ.
If u2ð  R R0
1;R0
 1Þ¼f x2g, then let   R R2 ¼ R0
2. Suppose that ju2ð  R R1;R0
 1Þj   2. Let
  R R2 2 Lðx2;x1Þ be such that u2ð  R R1;R0
 1Þ  P P2;. Similarly as above it follows that
u2ð  R R1;   R R2;R0
 1;2Þ¼f x2g and for all i 2 Nnf2g, uið  R R1;   R R2;R0
 1;2Þ¼uið  R R1;R0
 1Þ.
Let   R R  ð  R R1;   R R2;R0
 1;2Þ. Hence,   R R1 2 Lðx1;x2Þ,   R R2 2 Lðx2;x1Þ,
u1ð  R RÞ¼f x1g and u2ð  R RÞ¼f x2g : ð2Þ
Let ~ R R 2 RN be such that Bð~ R R1Þ¼Bð~ R R2Þ¼f x1g, fx1;x2g~ P P1;, fx1;x2g~ P P2;,
and ~ R R 1;2 ¼ R0
 1;2.B yeﬃciency, u1ð~ R RÞ¼f x1g or u2ð~ R RÞ¼f x1g. Without loss
of generality, suppose that u1ð~ R RÞ¼f x1g and u2ð~ R RÞ¼; .
Let ~ R R0
1 2 Lðx1;x2Þ; i.e., x1 ~ P P0
1x2. Since u1ð~ R RÞ¼f x1g,b ystrategy-proofness,
x1 2 u1ð~ R R0
1; ~ R R 1Þ. Thus, by eﬃciency, u1ð~ R R0
1; ~ R R 1Þ¼f x1;x2g and
u2ð~ R R0
1; ~ R R 1Þ¼; . Let ~ R R00
1 2 Lðx2;x1Þ; i.e., x2 ~ P P00
1x1.B yeﬃciency and strategy-
proofness, u1ð~ R R00
1; ~ R R 1Þ¼f x1;x2g and u2ð~ R R00
1; ~ R R 1Þ¼; .
Let ~ R R0
2 2 Lðx1;x2Þ; i.e., x1 ~ P P0
2x2. Since x1 ~ P P2fx1;x2g~ P P2;,b ystrategy-proofness,
x1= 2u2ð~ R R00
1; ~ R R0
2; ~ R R 1;2Þ. Thus, by eﬃciency, x1 2 u1ð~ R R00
1; ~ R R0
2; ~ R R 1;2Þ. Since x2 ~ P P00
1x1
and x1 ~ P P0
2x2, eﬃciency implies that fx2g 6¼ u2ð~ R R00
1; ~ R R0
2; ~ R R 1;2Þ. Thus,
u1ð~ R R00
1; ~ R R0
2; ~ R R 1;2Þ¼f x1;x2g and u2ð~ R R00
1; ~ R R0
2; ~ R R 1;2Þ¼; . Applying strategy-
proofness twice and since ~ R R 1;2 ¼   R R 1;2, it follows that u1ð  R RÞ¼f x1;x2g and
u2ð  R RÞ¼; , a contradiction to (2). Hence, without loss of generality, if
R 2 RN is such that for all i 2 N, BðRiÞ¼K, then u1ðRÞ¼K.
Step 2. We prove that for all R 2 RN, u1ðRÞ¼BðR1Þ.
Let R1 2 RN be such that for all i 2 N, BðR1
i Þ¼K. By Step 1,
u1ðR1Þ¼BðR1
1Þ¼K. Let R2 ¼ð R1
1;R 1Þ2RN. If we change proﬁle R1
stepwise to proﬁle R2, then it follows by strategy-proofness and non-bossiness
that u1ðR2Þ¼K and for all i 2 Nnf1g, uiðR2Þ¼; .
Let R3 ¼ð  R R1;R 1Þ2RN be such that Bð  R R1Þ¼BðR1Þ and for all
S (BðR1Þ, K   P P1S. Thus, by eﬃciency and strategy-proofness, u1ðR3Þ¼Bð  R R1Þ.
Finally, by strategy-proofness, u1ðRÞ¼BðR1Þ. Hence, without loss of gener-
ality, agent 1 is the (unique) ﬁrst dictator.
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Let R 2 RN and set pRð1Þ¼1. Since u1ðRÞ¼BðR1Þ, it follows that for all
i 2 Nnf1g, uiðRÞ BðRiÞnBðR1Þ. Keeping R1 ﬁxed and varying the prefer-
ences of all remaining agents, similarly as in Steps 1 and 2, we can prove that
there must exist a (unique) dictator pRð2Þ over the remaining set of objects
KnBðR1Þ if BðR1Þ 6¼ K.I fBðR1Þ¼K, then we could choose pRð2Þ arbitrarily
from NnfpRð1Þg. Thus, upRð2ÞðRÞ¼BðRpRð2ÞÞnBðR1Þ. Hence, using Steps 1 and
2 sequentially, we can derive some pR 2 PN such that (3) holds.
Step 4. Finally, we show that for all R 2 RN we can choose pR 2 PN such
that (3) holds and for all R;   R R 2 RN and pR;p  R R 2 PN the following additional
conditions are satisﬁed:
(i) pRð1Þ¼p  R Rð1Þ.
(ii) Let m 2f 1;...;n   1g. If for all i 2f 1;...;mg, pRðiÞ¼p  R RðiÞ and
upRðiÞðRÞ¼up   R RðiÞð  R RÞ, then pRðm þ 1Þ¼p  R Rðm þ 1Þ.
Let R 2 RN. By Step 2, agent 1 is the ﬁrst dictator. Let pRð1Þ 1 and
recursively deﬁne pR as follows:
Let m 2f 1;...;n   1g.I f[
pRðmÞ
i¼pRð1ÞBðRiÞ¼K, then pRðm þ 1Þ 
minðNnfpRð1Þ;...;pRðmÞgÞ. Otherwise, if [
pRðmÞ
i¼pRð1ÞBðRiÞ 6¼ K, then by Step 2
and 3 there exists a unique dictator in NnfpRð1Þ;...;pRðmÞg over the
remaining objects Kn[
pRðmÞ
i¼pRð1Þ BðRiÞ. Let j 2 NnfpRð1Þ;...;pRðmÞg be this
dictator. Deﬁne pRðm þ 1Þ j.
By deﬁnition and Step 2, (3) and (i) hold. In order to complete the proof,
we show (ii) by induction on m.
Induction basis m ¼ 1. By (i) and Step 3, pRð1Þ¼p  R Rð1Þ¼1. We show that if
u1ðRÞ¼u1ð  R RÞ, then pRð2Þ¼p  R Rð2Þ.
If u1ðRÞ¼u1ð  R RÞ¼K, then BðR1Þ¼Bð  R R1Þ¼K. By deﬁnition pRð2Þ¼
p  R Rð2Þ¼2, the desired conclusion.
Let u1ðRÞ¼u1ð  R RÞ 6¼ K. Let R0;   R R0 2 RN be such that R0
1 ¼ R1,   R R0
1 ¼   R R1,
and for all i 2 Nnf1g, BðR0
iÞ¼Bð  R R0
iÞ¼K and R0
i ¼   R R0
i. By (i),
pR0ð1Þ¼p  R R0ð1Þ¼1. Hence,
u1ðR0Þ¼BðR0
1Þ¼Bð  R R0
1Þ¼u1ð  R R0Þ : ð4Þ
By deﬁnition and Step 3 it follows that pRð2Þ¼pR0ð2Þ and p  R Rð2Þ¼p  R R0ð2Þ.
Hence,
upRð2ÞðR0Þ¼up   R Rð2Þð  R R0Þ¼Knu1ðR0Þ : ð5Þ
Recall that   R R0 ¼ð  R R0
1;R0
 1Þ. By (4), strategy-proofness and non-bossiness
imply uð  R R0Þ¼uð  R R0
1;R0
 1Þ¼uðR0Þ. Thus, by (5), pR0ð2Þ¼p  R R0ð2Þ. Hence,
pRð2Þ¼p  R Rð2Þ, the desired conclusion of (ii).
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pRðiÞ¼p  R RðiÞ and upRðiÞðRÞ¼up   R RðiÞð  R RÞ, then pRðmÞ¼p  R RðmÞ.
Induction Step m ! m þ 1: Let m 2f 1;...;n   1g. Suppose that for all
i 2f 1;...;mg, pRðiÞ¼p  R RðiÞ and upRðiÞðRÞ¼up   R RðiÞð  R RÞ. We have to prove that
pRðm þ 1Þ¼p  R Rðm þ 1Þ.
Without loss of generality, suppose that pRð1Þ¼1;...;pRðmÞ¼m.
Hence, p  R Rð1Þ¼1;...;p  R RðmÞ¼m. Let M  f 1;...;mg.I f[i2MuiðRÞ¼K,
then [i2MBðRiÞ¼[ i2MBð  R RiÞ¼K. Since NnfpRð1Þ;...;pRðmÞg ¼
Nnfp  R Rð1Þ;...;p  R RðmÞg ¼ NnM, by deﬁnition pRðm þ 1Þ¼p  R Rðm þ 1Þ¼m þ 1,
the desired conclusion.
Let [i2MuiðRÞ¼[ i2Muið  R RÞ 6¼ K . Let R0;   R R0 2 RN be such that for all
i 2 M, R0
i ¼ Ri,   R R0
i ¼   R Ri, and for all i 2 NnM, BðR0
iÞ¼Bð  R R0
iÞ¼K and R0
i ¼   R R0
i.
By our induction hypothesis, RM ¼ R0
M, and   R RM ¼   R R0
M, we have for all i 2 M,
pRðiÞ¼pR0ðiÞ and p  R RðiÞ¼p  R R0ðiÞ:
By deﬁnition and Step 3 it follows that pRðm þ 1Þ¼pR0ðm þ 1Þ and
p  R Rðm þ 1Þ¼p  R R0ðm þ 1Þ. Hence, for all i 2 M,
uiðR0Þ¼uið  R R0Þð 6Þ
and
upRðmþ1ÞðR0Þ¼up   R Rðmþ1Þð  R R0Þ¼Kn[ i2M uiðR0Þ : ð7Þ
By Step 3 and (i), u1ðR0Þ¼BðR0
1Þ and u1ð  R R0Þ¼Bð  R R0
1Þ. By (6), strategy-
proofness and non-bossiness imply uð  R R0
1;R0
 1Þ¼uðR0Þ. By Step 3 and the




1Þ and u2ð  R R0Þ¼Bð  R R0
2ÞnBð  R R0
1Þ.
Similarly as above it follows that uð  R R0
1;   R R0
2;R0




NnM ¼   R R0
NnM and (6) holds, by changing the preferences of agents 1;...;m at
proﬁle R0 stepwise to those at   R R0 it follows that uðR0Þ¼uð  R R0Þ. Thus, by (7),
pR0ðm þ 1Þ¼p  R R0ðm þ 1Þ. Hence, pRðm þ 1Þ¼p  R Rðm þ 1Þ, the desired conclu-
sion of (ii).
Step 4 completes the proof showing that u is a sequential dictatorship. j
Remark 1. The proof of Theorem 1 remains valid if we restrict the preference
domain R to the domain of additive and strict preference relations A. By
strategy-proofness, it is easy to show that Theorem 1 remains valid on the larger
domain of strict preference relations S.5 Pa´pai (2001) gives a direct proof of the
equivalence of (a) and (c) as stated in Theorem 1 on the domain of strict
preference relations S. As already mentioned in the Introduction, our proof is
diﬀerent from Pa´pai’s (2001) proof; her proof uses the non-separable preference
relation where receiving all objects is strictly preferred to receiving nothing, but
receiving nothing is strictly preferred to receiving some but not all
objects. /
5 On the general domain of strict preferences, the formal deﬁnition of sequential
dictatorships has to be slightly adjusted.
274 L. Ehlers, B. KlausRemark 2. When each agent receives exactly one object and all objects are
preferred to receiving nothing, Svensson (1999) shows that serial dictatorships
are the only rules satisfying eﬃciency, strategy-proofness, non-bossiness,and
‘‘neutrality’’ (the rule does not depend on the names of the objects).6 His result
does not apply to multiple assignment problems. Using Theorem 1 these prop-
erties characterize the sequential dictatorships where the choice of the next
dictator depends only on the cardinalities of the sets of objects chosen by the
previous dictators. /
To conclude this section, we discuss the logical independence of the
properties in Theorem 1.
Any constant rule satisﬁes coalitional strategy-proofness (strategy-proof-
ness and non-bossiness), but not eﬃciency; e.g., let u be such that for all
R 2 RN, uiðRÞ¼; .7
Example 1. Let N ¼f 1;2;3g. For all R 2 RN ,i fBðR1Þ BðR2Þ, then
u1ðRÞ BðR1Þ, u2ðRÞ ; , and u3ðRÞ BðR3ÞnBðR1Þ. Otherwise, u2ðRÞ 
BðR2Þ, u1ðRÞ BðR1ÞnBðR2Þ,a n du3ðRÞ BðR3ÞnðBðR1Þ[BðR2ÞÞ. The rule u
satisﬁes non-bossiness and eﬃciency, but not strategy-proofness. /
Rules that are similarly deﬁned as sequential dictatorships but the choice
of the next dictators depends on the exact preference relation of the ﬁrst
dictator are eﬃcient and strategy-proof, but violate non-bossiness.
4 Resource-monotonicity
In this section we admit variations of the set of objects to be assigned. First
we extend our model and notation. We interpret K to be the set of potential
objects. We use K to denote a set of nonempty subsets of K satisfying
(a) K 2 K and
(b) there exists a partition K1;...;Kl, l   2, of K such that fK1;...;Klg K
and for all K0 2 K, there exists an index set I  f 1;...;lg such that
K0 ¼[ h2IKh.8
Sets K0 2 K are called admissible. Throughout the remaining part of the
paper an assignment problem consists of an admissible set of objects K0 2 K
6 For example, if at a certain proﬁle where all agents announce the same preference
relation agent 1 receives the commonly most preferred object, then neutrality implies
that he does so at all proﬁles with ‘‘maximal conﬂict’’.
7 Let k   n. Then ‘‘hierarchical exchange rules’’ (Pa ´ pai 2000a) are rules that assign at
every preference proﬁle to each agent exactly one object. In the multiple assignment
model ‘‘hierarchical exchange rules’’ satisfy strategy-proofness and non-bossiness but
not eﬃciency.
8 The case where objects can come in any possible combination is the special case
where l ¼ k and for all h 2f 1;...;kg, Kh ¼ xh.
Multiple assignment problems 275and a preference proﬁle R 2 RN.9 A rule u associates with each assignment
problem ðR;K0Þ2RN   K an assignment uðR;K0Þ such that [i2NuiðR;K0Þ
  K0 and for all i;j 2 N such that i 6¼ j, uiðR;K0Þ\ujðR;K0Þ¼; .
It is straightforward to adjust the properties of rules we introduced in Sects. 2
and 3 to the model at hand.
When the set of objects varies, then a natural requirement is resource-
monotonicity. Conditions of resource-monotonicity have been studied by Chun
and Thomson (1988), Moulin and Thomson (1988), and Thomson (1994).
Resource-monotonicity describes the eﬀect of a change in the available
resource on the welfare of the agents. A rule satisﬁes resource-monotonicity,i f
after such a change either all agents (weakly) lose together or all (weakly) gain
together.
It is easy to show that in combination with eﬃciency, resource-monoto-
nicity implies the following: given some ﬁxed preference proﬁle and some
ﬁxed set of objects, if new additional objects are available, then – this being
good news – all agents (weakly) gain. We use the following weaker version of
resource-monotonicity.
Resource-monotonicity. For all R 2 RN and all K0;K00 2 K,i fK0   K00, then
for all i 2 N, uiðR;K00ÞRiuiðR;K0Þ.
Our notion of resource-monotonicity is weak because we do not require
that all subsets of K are admissible. It is possible that K contains only three
subsets of K.
Next, we prove that in combination with eﬃciency and coalitional strat-
egy-proofness only serial dictatorships satisfy resource-monotonicity. Before
stating the result we extend the deﬁnition of serial dictatorships.
Serial dictatorship. Let p 2 PN. The serial dictatorship up with respect to p is













We call agent pð1Þ the ﬁrst dictator, agent pð2Þ the second dictator, etc.  
9 Note that even though not all objects in K may be available, agents’ preferences are
deﬁned over 2K. This assumption mainly simpliﬁes our notation, but all results would
remain true if instead we would assume that in an assignment problem preferences are
deﬁned over the set of admissible objects.
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tional strategy-proofness, and resource-monotonicity.
Proof. It is easy to check that serial dictatorships satisfy the properties listed
in Theorem 2.
Conversely, let u be a rule satisfying eﬃciency, coalitional strategy-
proofness, and resource-monotonicity. Let K0 2 K. Then, uð ;K0Þ satisﬁes
eﬃciency and coalitional strategy-proofness on RN. By Theorem 1, uð ;K0Þ is
a sequential dictatorship. Hence, for each R 2 RN we can ﬁnd pK0
R 2 PN as in
the deﬁnition of a sequential dictatorship such that uðR;K0Þ¼upK0
R ðR;K0Þ.W e
show in three steps that u is a serial dictatorship.
Step 1. Let ðR;K0Þ2RN   K and   m m 2 N be such that
[  m m 1
i¼1 upK0








R ðm 1Þg ¼ RfpK0
R ð1Þ;...;pK0
R ðm 1Þg
and for all i 2 NnfpK0
R ð1Þ;...;pK0
R ðm   1Þg, BðRm
i Þ¼K.
Induction basis m ¼ 1: Since uð ;K0Þ and uð ;KÞ are sequential dictator-










Rð1Þ, the desired conclusion for the induction basis.
Induction hypothesis. For all i 2f 1;...;mg , let pK0
R ðiÞ¼pK
RðiÞ.
Induction step m ! m þ 1 for m <   m m. Since u is a sequential dictatorship, (ii)
in the deﬁnition of sequential dictatorships implies that for all












RðiÞðRmþ1;KÞ 6¼; . By the induction hypothesis and resource-
monotonicity, pK0
R ðm þ 1Þ¼pK
Rðm þ 1Þ, the desired conclusion. This completes
the proof of Step 1.
Step 2. Let ðR;K0Þ2RN   K. If for all i 2 N, uiðR;KÞ K0, then
uðR;K0Þ¼uðR;KÞ.
By resource-monotonicity, for all i 2 N, uiðR;KÞRiuiðR;K0Þ. Since for all
i 2 N, uiðR;KÞ K0, eﬃciency implies uðR;K0Þ¼uðR;KÞ.
Step 3. We prove that there exists p 2 PN such that for all
ðR;K0Þ2RN   K, uðR;K0Þ¼upðR;K0Þ.
Let K1 2 K be such that K1 6¼ K. First, we show that uð ;K1Þ is a serial
dictatorship.
Let R; 2 RN be such that for all i 2 N, BðR;
i Þ¼; . Deﬁne p1
;   pK1
R;. Since
uð ;K1Þ is a sequential dictatorship, p1
;ð1Þ is uniquely deﬁned; i.e., for all
R 2 RN, pK1
R ð1Þ¼p1
;ð1Þ and for all m 2f 1;...;n   1g: if for all
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R ðm þ 1Þ¼p1
;ðm þ 1Þ. We show that uð ;K1Þ is a serial dictatorship with
respect to p1
;.
Let R 2 RN be such that for all i 2 N, BðRiÞ KnK1. Then,
[n 1
i¼1 upK1
R ðiÞðR;K1Þ¼;6¼ K1. So, by Step 1, pK
R ¼ p1
;. Hence, uð ;KÞ is a serial
dictatorship on those proﬁles. By the assumptions on K, there exists K2 2 K
such that K2 6¼;and K1 \ K2 ¼; .
Let R 2 RNsuch that for all i 2 N, BðRiÞ K2. Thus, for all i 2 N,
BðRiÞ KnK1. Hence, uðR;KÞ¼u
p1
;ðR;KÞ. By Step 2, uðR;K2Þ¼u
p1
;ðR;KÞ.
By strategy-proofness, if some agent i changes his preference Ri to R0
i such that
BðR0





i;R iÞ;KÞ. Since the same conclusion remains
valid for all R 2 RN,b ycoalitional strategy-proofness, uð ;K2Þ is a serial
dictatorship with respect to p1
;; i.e., for all R 2 RN, uðR;K2Þ¼u
p1
;ðR;K2Þ.
Analogously we can deﬁne p2
;   pK2
R; and show that for all R 2 RN such
that for all i 2 N, BðRiÞ KnK2,w eh a v epK
R ¼ p2
;. Moreover, the above
argument shows that uð ;K1Þ is a serial dictatorship with respect to p2
;; i.e.,





;.Thenthereexistagentsi;j 2 N and   R R 2 RN suchthat
Bð  R RiÞ¼Bð  R RjÞ¼K1 [ K2,   R R i;j ¼ R;
 i;j, uið  R R;K1Þ¼K1, and ujð  R R;K2Þ¼K2.
But then, since uð ;K1 [ K2Þ is also a sequential dictatorship, either
[uið  R R;K1 [ K2Þ¼K1 [ K2 and ujð  R R;K1 [ K2Þ¼; ]o r[ uið  R R;K1 [ K2Þ¼;
and ujð  R R;K1 [ K2Þ¼K1 [ K2]. Either case is in contradiction to resource-
monotonicity. Thus, p1
; ¼ p2
;. Let p   p1
;.
By our deﬁnition of K, there exists a partition K1;...;Kl, l   2, of K such
that fK1;...;Klg K and for all K0 2 K there exists an index set
I  f 1;...;lg such that K0 ¼[ h2IKh . So far we have shown that for all
h 2f 1;...;lg and all R 2 RN,
uðR;KhÞ¼upðR;KhÞ: ð8Þ
Next, we show that uð ;KÞ is a serial dictatorship with respect to p. Let
R 2 RN and h 2f 1;...;lg. By (8), uðR;KhÞ¼upðR;KhÞ. Let   m mh 2 N be
maximal such that [  m mh 1
i¼1 upðiÞðR;KhÞ 6¼ Kh. By Step 1, for all i 2f 1;...;   m mhg,
pK
RðiÞ¼pðiÞ. Thus, since uð ;KÞ is a sequential dictatorship, for all




h¼1 [  m mh
i¼1 upðiÞðR;KhÞ¼[ i2NuiðR;KÞ;
(9) implies for all i 2 N,
upðiÞðR;KÞ¼[ l
h¼1upðiÞðR;KhÞ:
Hence, uðR;KÞ¼upðR;KÞ. Thus, uð ;KÞ is a serial dictatorship with respect
to p.
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We have proven that uðR0;KÞ¼upðR0;KÞ. Since for all i 2 N, BðR0
iÞ K0,b y
eﬃciency, for all i 2 N, uiðR0;KÞ K0. Thus, Step 2 implies
uðR0;K0Þ¼uðR0;KÞ. Note that uðR0;KÞ¼upðR0;KÞ¼upðR0;K0Þ. Hence,
uðR0;K0Þ¼upðR0;K0Þ and by (10), uðR;K0Þ¼upðR;K0Þ. This completes the
proof. j
Remark 3. The proof of Theorem 2 remains valid on the preference domain
A. /
Similar examples as for Theorem 1 can be used to establish the indepen-
dence of the properties in Theorem 2. In particular, in Theorem 2 coalitional
strategy-proofness cannot be weakened to strategy-proofness because then the
choice of the next dictators may depend on the exact preference relation of
the ﬁrst dictators.
The following example shows that Theorem 2 becomes an incompatibility
on the domain of strict preference relations S.
Example 2. Let N ¼f 1;2g, K ¼f x1;x2g, and K ¼f f x1g;fx2g;Kg. Let u
denote the serial dictatorship with agent 1 as ﬁrst dictator and agent 2 as the
second dictator. Let R ¼ð R1;R2Þ2SfNg be such that fx1;x2gP1;P1x1P1x2 and
R2 2 Lðx1Þ. Then, uðR;fx1;x2gÞ ¼ ðfx1;x2g;;Þ and uðR;fx1gÞ ¼ ð;;fx1gÞ.
Hence, in contradiction to resource-monotonicity, u1ðR;fx1;x2gÞP1u1ðR;fx1gÞ
and u2ðR;fx1gÞP2u2ðR;fx1;x2gÞ. /
Remark 4. The restriction of the structure of K is tight. If K does not satisfy
property (b), then it is possible to ﬁnd rules that are sequential dictatorships on
some subsets of K and that satisfy all the properties of Theorem 2. /
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